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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TO. RICHARDSON, INC.
Case Number 980050
Plaintiff
Oral Argument Requested

vs

Priority 15

STEPHEN W. BROCKBANK
Defendant

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann.§ 78-2a-3(2)(I)(1996). The
final order was entered on December 30, 1997 on Civil Case 96 6910976. The Defendant
filed his notice of appeal within 30 days on January 16, 1998; the docketing statement was
filed on February 6, 1998. An April 29, 1998 letter from Supreme Court Deputy Clerk
Babette May to the Defendant advised the Defendant that his appellant's brief is due on June
11, 1998. The notice of appeal was filed within 30 days and was therefore timely.
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ISSUES PRESENTED
This appeal addresses three issues. They are:
1.

The changing of a judgement issued by Superior Court in Hartford,
Connecticut on December 6, 1993 ("Judgement") to include items proposed
by the attorney for the Plaintiff and not in the original Judgement. As of the
filing of this brief no written Final Order has been received from the Third
District Court by the Defendant. However, the verbal Final Order contains the
following items that are not in the Judgement: a) program documentation, b)
data files, and c) updates past the date of the Judgement. The Plaintiff seeks
to include these items by use of a Decision Memorandum, disregarding the
errors, omissions, and direct contradictions ofthe Decision Memorandum with
the Defendants employment contract and, in effect, seeks to imofficially
reopen the case for judgement without due process of law.

2.

The use of a Decision Memorandum not in evidence at the time of the original
Judgement, which was proved to contain false, incorrect, and perjured
statements, to substantiate revisions of the original Judgement by the Plaintiff
while the use of the same Decision Memorandum was denied to the Defendant
to substantiate claims by the Defendant.

3.

The handcuffing of the pro se Defendant behind his back during the hearing
when the final order was issued preventing the Defendant from using his notes
2

and thereby presenting his defense of the issues surrounding the use of the
Decision Memorandum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A Judgement, shown in Exhibit A, was issued against the Defendant in Superior
Court, Hartford, Connecticut on December 6, 1993 without the Defendant being notified of
the hearing at which witness for the Plaintiff, an attorney in the state of Connecticut,
committed perjury under oath. The same judge who heard the original case was assigned
to hear the appeal introduced false evidence, incorrectly reworded statements from original
employment contracts, subsequently did not correct these errors, and thus found no fault with
the original decision. The case focused on monies owed the Defendant and computer code
to which the Plaintiff claimed access after the Plaintiff fired the Defendant and refused to
pay the Defendant wages and commissions as specified in the Defendant's employment
contract. These wages and commissions are now estimated to be approximately $2,000,000.
The Plaintiff sought compliance with the Judgement in the Third District Court, Salt
Lake County in hearings on October 8, 1997, December 17, 1997, and December 30, 1997.
At these hearings the Third District Court ordered the Defendant to produce items not
present in the original Judgement. The Defendant objected to this action of the Third
District Court, citing the Third District Court's previous adherence to only the items
3

specifically called for in the Judgement The Third District Court nevertheless ordered the
Defendant to comply with a revised Judgement prepared by the Plaintiff and pay costs of the
December 30, 1997 court session In chambers prior to the hearing on December 30, 1997,
the Defendant was handcuffed behind his back and remained constrained in that manner
throughout the hearing

To present his defense of the use of the wrongful Decision

Memorandum, the Defendant needed access to items brought into the courtroom, but was
imable to use these items and thus present his defense It was not known to the Defendant
that such procedures would be implemented while the Defendant was expected to present
his defense, and in prior hearings Third District Court did not implement such restraints

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The arguments for reversal of the Final Order are that:
A.

Third District Court of Salt Lake County changed a Judgement from another
state proposed by the Plaintiffs counsel without reopening the case;

B.

Third District Court of Salt Lake County admitted statements from a Decision
Memorandum, introduced by the Plaintiff, such Decision Memorandum not
presented at the hearing at which the original Judgement was made, to
substantiate claims by the Plaintiff without reopening the case, but did not
allow the Defendant to present evidence substantiating the incorrect and
wrongful conclusions from the Decision Memorandum.

C.

At the request of the Defendant, the Third District Court refused to read into
the record the original Judgement before making a determination that the
Defendant did or did not comply with that Judgement, and;

D.

The Third District Court handcuffed the pro se Defendant behind his back,
preventing the Defendant's defense of his objection to the use of the wrongful
Decision Memorandum and the revised judgement based on it.
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CONCLUSION
The Defendant claims that the Third District Court does not have the authority to
change a Judgement without reopening the case, that evidence shown to be wrongful and
incorrect may not be introduced without a fair hearing and proper cross examination, and
that a pro se Defendant must be allowed to present a defense, otherwise an attorney should
be appointed for him.
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of June, 1998.

^

/Anfrr?,<zo^f~z>

Stephen W. Brockbank
Defendant - APPELLANT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On June 11, 1998 a true and correct copy of the Appellant's Brief was sent by U.S.
first class mail to the attorney for the Plaintiff, Mark E. Wilkey, Fillmore, Belliston &
Israelson, 3549 North University, Suite 250, Provo, UT 84604.

Stephen W. Brockbank, Defendant, Pro Se
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Exhibit A
Original Judgement

DOCKET NO.: CV 93-0703826
T. O . RICHARDSON COMPANY, INC.
2 Bridgewater Road, Farmington, CT
06032-2256

SUPERIOR COURT
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HARTFORD/
NEW BRITAIN AT HARTFORD

V.
STEPHEN W. BROCKBANK
263 G Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84104

DECEMBER 6, 1993
MAY 30, 1996

Present: Hon. Michael R. Sheldon, Judge
JUDGMENT
This action, by Writ, verified Complaint, Affidavit, Application for Temporary
Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order and Order To Show Cause, seeking damages of
specific performance, or, in the alternative, money damages for breach of contract, fraud,
conversion, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-564, and misappropriation of trade secrets,
pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §35-50, et seq.. came to Superior Court on January 5, 1993,
and thence to December 6,1993, when the Court found in a Hearing in Damages for the
Plaintiff on all counts of the Complaint and Cross-Complaint whereby the Defendant
must: 1) disclose all source codes, including uncomplied source codes, to the Plaintiff with
respect to the Star Program of his Equity Investment Guide; 2) make full disclosure of any
modification made to the Star Program since his termination in October 1992; 3) provide to
the Plaintiff on or before December 31, 1993 any software needed to encrypt the source code
if so encrypted; and 4) pay to the Plaintiff compensatory damages in the amount of
$90,530.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of $12,197.00, and thence to May 30,
1996, when the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion For Order of Weekly Payments providing
for weekly payments of $50.00 to the Plaintiff.
Whereupon, it is adjudged that the Defendant pay to the Plaintiff $90,530.00
compensatory damages and $12,197.00 exemplary damages in weekly payments of $50.00.
" J J 1 3 3H1J0 33UJ0

•M0U02V..,-
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CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to Stephen
W. Brockbank, 263 G Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84104, on this l&ft day of August, 1997.
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Exhibit B
Revised Judgement by the Plaintiff

Stephen W. Brockbank

August 21, 1997

Honorable Leslie A. Lewis
Third District Court
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 44111
Dear Judge Lewis:
Yesterday, August 20,1997,1 received a letter addressed to you of August 18, 1997 from
Attorney Mark E. Wilkey together with his prepared NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION
("NOTICE")and RULING ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ("RULING"). He had previously sent
to me, on August 15,1997 a proposed draft of these documents to which I responded to him about
errors in his draft. He has not responded to the errors I pointed out and has submitted the above
named documents to your Court.
Mr. Wilkey stated in his letter that I did not object to his proposed drafts. That is not the
case. I did object and attempted to clarify the errors with Mr. Wilkey, however he has chosen to file
the above nevertheless. Therefore, I would like to formally respond to Mr. Wilkey and the proposed
NOTICE and RULING and am today filing the enclosed OBJECTION TO RULING ON ORDER
TO SHOW CAUSE with Oral Argument Requested so that there are no mistakes in interpretation
of what is to be done to resolve this matter.

Sincerely,

Stephen W. Brockbank

cc:

Mark E. Wilkey
Fillmore Law Offices, Provo, Utah
enclosures

263 G Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 - Phone (801) 363-2738

Stephen W. Brockbank
263 G Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 363-2738

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

T.O. RICHARDSON, INC.
OBJECTION TO ORDER
Plaintiff
Civil No. 96 6910976FJ

vs
STEPHEN W. BROCKBANK

Judge Leslie A. Lewis
Oral Argument Requested

Defendant

The Defendant, having appeared before the Third District Court in the State of Utah ("the
Court") on August 7, 1997 and having been advised by the Court as to the forthcoming Order to
comply with a Judgement from the Superior Court in the State of Connecticut ("the Connecticut
Court") and now before the Court, desires to enter this objection to the proposed RULING ON
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE as prepared by Utah counsel for the Plaintiff based on the grounds that
fraud was committed against the Defendant and the Connecticut Court. Specifically, the Defendant
submits evidence that will show in this Objection that testimony under oath given by the
attomey/owner of the Plaintiff, Samuel Bailey, Jr, Esq., to the Connecticut Court was false and was
known to be false at the time it was given and was given with the intent to defraud the Defendant

1

of the Defendant's property.
The Defendant calls the Courts attention to item number five (5) of the Plaintiffs proposed
ORDER ON RULING TO SHOW CAUSE, specifically Item B. which reads as follows:
"5,

Defendant Brockbank is hereby ordered to comply with the injunctive portions of the

Connecticut Judgement with 30 days of August 7, 1997 including, specifically, to:
A.

Disclose to Richardson all source codes, including the uncompiled source

codes with respect to the STAR computer program:
£L

Disclose to Richardson any modification Brockbank has made with respect

to the STAR program following the termination of his employment with Richardson: and
C,

Disclose or provide any software or program required to unencrypt the source

code for Plaintiffs STAR program, if the source code is so encrypted."
Exhibit A shows an employment agreement letter of November 27, 1991 (the last in a series
of three employment agreement letters dated August 20,1990, March 19, 1991, and November 27,
1991) in which the Plaintiff, Samuel Bailey, Jr, Esq. states:
"If you are no longer employed by the Company, vour future obligation to inform the
Company about future changes to STAR shall apply only to the STAR programs as
they exist on the date you leave the Company's employment."

The Defendant was terminated from the Plaintiff on August 19,1992 and the Defendant filed
claim for wages and commissions with the Connecticut Department of Labor in November 1992.
In December 1992 the Plaintiff, Samuel Bailey, Jr, Esq. filed civil suit which the Plaintiff knew
would prevent the Connecticut Department of Labor to pursue action on the complaint.
2

On December 6, 1993, the Plaintiff, Samuel Bailey, Jr, Esq. gave testimony in the
Connecticut Court shown on page 19 of an official trial transcript of that hearing in Exhibit B
(applicable statements underlined) in which Judge Michael Sheldon asks: "And you also claim the
right, as long as the program, the basic program is the one that existed at the time of his departure,
do you claim the right to any updates in that program?" The Plaintiff answers: "Yes". This answer
was in direct contradiction to the letter agreement written by the person giving testimony.
If it please the Court to know that this hearing was held without the Defendant having
received notice thereof, and therefore was not present to defend against this obviously false
statement. Numerous other false testimony was also given at that hearing, but is not directly
involved in the RULING ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE now before the Court.

CONCLUSION
The Defendant and Plaintiff entered into the letter agreement of November 27, 1992 for the
express purpose of preventing the Plaintiff from terminating the Defendant and then having rights
to the Defendant's property in perpetuity, recognizing that it would befraudulentfor the Plaintiff
to acquire access to the Defendant's intellectual property and then terminate the Defendant with
rights to future modifications without future compensation. The Plaintiff then knowingly and with
intent gave false testimony to the Connecticut Court with impunity because there would be no cross
examination since the Defendant did not receive notice of the hearing and was not present.

3

PRAYER
The Defendant therefore asks the Court to modify its RULING ON ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE and set aside the Judgement until the fraud is removed from the Plaintiffs proposed Order.
Specifically that Paragraph 5. B reflect the original contract and read as follows:
"5.

B.

Disclose to Richardson any modification made to the STAR program as it

existed on the date Brockbank left the Company's employment which was on August 19, 1992."

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of August, 1997.

Stephen W. Brockbank, Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the 14th day of August, 1997 a true and correct copy of the foregoing, including Exhibits
A and B was sent to Mark E. Wilkey at Filmore, Belliston & Israelsen via U.S. first class mail at
3549 N. University Ave. - Suite 250, Provo, UT 84604.

Stephen W. Brockbank, Defendant
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Exhibit A

Letter Agreement by Plaintiff of November 27, 1992

T. O. Richardson Company, Inc.
Investment Advisor

November 27, 1991

Stephen W. Brockbank
Senior Vice President
T.O. Richardson Company, Inc.
11 Main Street
Farmington, CT 06032
Dear Steve:
This letter will clarify and modify our prior agreements
concerning your employment. Your employment is extended to
August 31, 1992 on the same terms as set forth in our agreements of August 20, 1990 and March 19, 1991. The Company
will notify you 90 days in advance if it intends not to
continue your draw after August 31, 1992, or for any period
thereafter.
You will provide the Company with all source codes,
documentation, input, limit factors and all other material
information regarding the use and operation of EIG, as soon
as possible and from time to time, in such form as the Company may reasonably reguest. In addition, you will provide
the Company with full information concerning any modifications you make to EIG at any time in the future. If ycpu are
no longer employed by the Company, your obligation to inform
the Company about future changes to'£is snail apply oniy ro
the EIQ pyogyams as they exist on the date you leave the
Company's employment.
The Company and you will enter into a non-disclosure
agreement which provides that neither you nor the Company
shall disclose EIG or any other of the company's proprietary
confidential information to anyone except principals of the
Company and certain consultants to the Company who are bound
to a comprehensive non-disclosure agreement.
Very truly yours,
T.O. RICHARDSON COMPANY, INC.

J&S&
President

AGREED to this 21

4h day olVWnrtuih**'

. 1991:

Exhibit B

Partial Transcript of Hearing of December 6, 1992
specifically
Cover Page, Page 19, and Certification of 33 Pages

19

A

In the State of Connecticut, yes.

Q

Do you claim any exclusive right to the use of this now

that he's left you or just the right to use it along with him?
A

No, the right to use it along with him.

0

And you claim also the right, as long as the orogram.

the basic program is the one that existed at the time of his
departure, do

you claim the

right to any updates

in that

program?
A

Yes.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Horan, call your next

wi tness?
MR. HORAN:

I ask that this be marked Exhibit D

for identification.
BY MR. HORAN:
Q

Handing you Plaintiff's D, do you recognize this?

A

This is a brochure which describes the component of EIG

called the STAR portfolio.

And STAR stands for

—

Q

Well rather than explaining —

do you recognize it?

A

Yes, I do.

Q

And do you know from what source it emanates?

A

This is a brochure that is being used currently by Mr.

Brockbank for marketing investment advice to clients for his
current employer.
Q

Using STAR?

A

Using STAR.
MR. HORAN:
Bailey.

Thank you.

That's all I have, Mr.

I ask that Exhibit D be admitted?

MO. CV93-O703826S
T. ~. RICHARDSON

SUPERIOR COURT
HAPTFORD/NEW BRITAIN J[)

VS.

AT HAR"ORD

STEPHEN W. BROCKBANK

DECEMBER

6, 1993

B e f o r e :
HONORABLE MICHAEL P. SHELDON, JUDGE

A o o e a r a n c e
For the Plaintiff:
Brian Horan, Esq.
For the Defendant:
Not Present

Ann C. Wolanin
Court Monitor

NO. CV93-0703826S

T. 0. RICHARDSON

COMPANY V. STEPHEN W.

BROCKBANK

C E R T I F I C A T I O N
I hereby certify the foregoing is transcript of the aboveentitled matter heard before the Honorable Michael R. Sheldon,
Judge, Superior Court for the Hartford/New Britain Judicial
District

on

the

6th

day

of

December,

1993

at

Hartford,

September,

1994

at

Hartford,

Connecti cut.
Dated

this

16th

day

of

Connecti cut.

Ann C. Wolanin, Court Monitor

Exhibit C
False Evidence in the Memorandum of Decision
Superior Court, Hartford, Connecticut

DOCKET NO.

CV93-0703826

T.O. RICHARDSON COMPANY, INC,

SUPERIOR COURT

V.

JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
HARTFORD/NEW BRITAIN
AT HARTFORD

STEPHEN W. BROCKBANK

APRIL 13, 1995
MOTION TO REVISE MEMORANDUM OF DECISION OF MARCH 23, 1995
BASED ON CONFLICTING EVIDENCE WITH CONTRACT DOCUMENTS
On March 23, 1995 the Superior Court

(Sheldon, J) issued a

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO REOPEN JUDGEMENT (»Memorandum
3/23/95"), shown in Exhibit I, denying the defendant's motion to
reopen judgement.

The defendant, Stephen W. Brockbank, submits to

the Court ITEMS 1 - 9

used in the Memorandum 3/23/95 that are

contrary to original evidence in the contract documents and facts
before the Court and respectfully requests the Court to revise its
Memorandum in view of these discovered differences upon which the
decision

was

rendered

and

order

the

plaintiff

to

honor

its

contracted payments to the defendant specified in ITEM 9.

ITEM 1
paragraph
contract

Memorandum 3/23/95, Page 2.
3 of
shown

the

August

in Exhibit

20, 1990
III.

The

The Court is referring to
(Exhibit
Court

III)

reads

employment
the

8/20/90

contract as follows:
"b. the defendant would bring with him to the plaintiff the
Equity Investment Guide ("EIG"), a computer software package
developed and then being improved upon by the defendant that
uses economic and financial information to manage individual
investment portfolios." (underlines added by defendant).

Comment:

As shown in Exhibit III, page 3, paragraph 3, the above

underlined quote by the Court does not appear.

In the 8/20/95

contract it was not stated and is not true that future development
of EIG/STAR was to be done for the Plaintiff.

EIG/STAR was

complete on arrival and had been used to manage money since 1986 at
Gardner & Preston Moss in Boston, MA and at Wright Investors'
Service in Bridgeport, CT.
EIG/STAR

done by

And there were no improvements to

the defendant

while

in

the

employ

of the

plaintiff. Throughout this case, the plaintiff has wrongly implied
that the plaintiff extended large sums of money to the defendant to
develop and improve EIG\STAR. This hearsay is baseless and without
proof and has been fabricated by the plaintiff. The plaintiff gave
this information as testimony under oath and it has somehow been
accepted by the Court as fact.

ITEM 2

Memorandum 3/23/95, Page 2.

paragraph 3 of the August 20, 1990
contract shown in Exhibit III.

The Court is referring to
(Exhibit

III) employment

The Court reads the 8/20/90

contract as follows:
"b. the Plaintiff would have exclusive rights to use EIG
while the Defendant was an employee of the Plaintiff, and,
should the Defendant leave the Plaintiff's employ, the
Plaintiff would have the right to continue to use EIG but
would incur the additional obligation of making a royalty
payment to the Defendant."
Comment:

As shown in Exhibit

III, page 3, paragraph 3, the

applicable statement in the 8/20/90 contract is:
"If you leave the employment of the company involuntarily, the
company may acquire exclusive rights to use EIG at a price to
be agreed upon or may continue to use EIG for a royalty

5

payment to you of 10% of the company's net income from money
under management using EIG."
The Plaintiff made no attempt to acquire EIG/STAR when the
Defendant

was

thereafter.

fired
The

on August

Plaintiff

16,

began

1990

the

or

for

lawsuit

three

only

months

after

the

Defendant filed for back wages an commissions with the Connecticut
Department Of Labor on November 10, 1990.

ITEM 3

Memorandum 3/23/95, Page 3.

The Court is referring to

page 1, paragraph 2 and page 3, item

(6) of the March 19, 1991

employment contract extension shown in Exhibit IV. The Court reads
the 3/19/91 contract as follows:
"a. the Defendant would continue to be responsible for
providing wholesale services to the airline pilot marketing
program; and
b.
as set forth in the 1990 Agreement, the Defendant would
continue to provide the Plaintiff with a detailed explanation
of the workings of EIG."
Comment:

As shown in Exhibit IV, page 1, paragraph 2, and page 3,

item (6) the applicable statements in the 3/19/91 contract are:
"a. For revenue generated from the Airline Pilot program, the
separate agreement for compensation and equity participation
in TOR with SWB stands as specified; and
b.
SWB shall continue to provide the Company with a detailed
explanation of the workings of the STAR program and shall
support other sales efforts within the Company for the STAR
program without additional compensation."
Underlines by
Defendant.
It is clear in the actual quote of (a.) that the Defendant
receives all of his compensation from the Airline Pilot program and
clear from (b.) that the Plaintiff did not intend to compensate the
Defendant in any way for sales efforts pertaining to STAR unless it
3

became successful.

In no case was money spent for the development

of STAR as the Plaintiff has claimed.
ITEM 4

Memorandum 3/23/95, Page 3.

The Court is referring to

paragraph 2 of the November 27, 1991 employment contract extension
shown in Exhibit V.

The Court reads the 11/27/91 contract as

follows:
M

a. the Defendant would provide the Plaintiff with all source
codes, documentation, input, limit factors, and all ocher
material information necessary to the use and generation of
EIG (collectively, "Source Code and Documentation, as socn as
possible and from time to time, in such form as the Plaintiff
might reasonably request.
b.
the Defendant would provide the Plaintiff with full
information regarding any modifications he made to EIG at anv
time in the future; and
c.
the Plaintiff and the Defendant would enter into a nondisclosure agreement whereby neither party would disclose EIG
or any other of the Plaintiff's property or confidential
information or trade secrets." Underlines by Defendant.
Comment:

As shown in Exhibit V, paragraph 2, the 11/2 7/91 contract

says:
"
You will provide the Company with all source codes,
documentation, input, limit factors and all other material
information regarding the use and operation of EIG, as soon as
possible and from time to time, in such form as the Company
may reasonably request.
In addition, you will provide the
Company with full information concerning any modifications you
make to EIG at any time in the future. If you are no longer
employed by the Company, your obligation to inform the Company
about future changes to EIG shall apply only to the EIG
programs as they exist on the date you leave the Company's
employment."
There is a large and material difference between being able 1}
to generate the EIG program and )2 to operate the EIG program.

The

first difference

the

is that in order to be able to generate

complete EIG program,

the proprietary modules in EIG with the
4
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investment formulae would have to be open to inspection, copy and
change.

This would violate the intellectual property rights of the

Defendant and make any payment for EIG mute and unnecessary.

The

second difference is that to be able to generate and market STAR
outside

the

control

of

the

owner

causes

the

possibility

of

contamination of the algorithm and a potential product liability
case.

Therefore, it was not granted to the Plaintiff to be able to

generate the EIG program in its entirety.
ability

to generate

any

of

the

data

The Plaintiff had the

input, manipulation

and

sequencing operations in EIG as well as any of the accounting and
reporting modules.
investment

In addition, the Plaintiff could write any

algorithm using EIG/STAR

data or data

from outside

sources to verify the veracity of the EIG/STAR programs.

The

Plaintiff decided against this alternative for cost reasons.
The 11/27/91 agreement clearly states that if the Plaintiff
acquires usage of EIG, the Defendant need only supply changes up to
termination of employment.

This clause was specifically worded to

prevent the Plaintiff from acquiring EIG, then firing the Defendant
and then have access to all future modification to EIG by the
Defendant without compensation.
nullifies

any

claim

by

the

This provision of the contract

Plaintiff

for

subsequent

EIG/STAR

modifications.

ITEM 5

Memorandum 3/23/95, Page 5, paragraph 1, last sentence,

the Court, referring to

Exhibits III, IV and V, states that:

"On August 19, 1992, however the plaintiff terminated the
defendant's employment for wilful failure to perform under the
5

terms of the above-described agreements."

Comment:
Defendant

As
on

shown

in Exhibit

November

13,

VI, the

1992,

Plaintiff

describing

the

wrote

to

the

reasons

for

termination on August 19, 1992, three months earlier and submitted
a back dated pink slip covering two months of employment ( 8/20/92
to 10/15/92 ) . The Plaintiff dated the pink slip August 19, 1992,
but noted his signature as 11/13/92.

This quick effort by the

Plaintiff to generate a cover up for the Plaintiff's termination of
the defendant without cause is supported by the Defendants November
10, 1992 Statement Of Claim For Wages filed with the Connecticut
Department Of Labor.

ITEM 6

Memorandum

3/23/95,

Page

11, paragraph

2, the

Court

states the testimony of Mr. Bailey as follows:
"
As relief for the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff
sought to obtain a copy of the Source Code and Documentation,
as described in its agreements with the defendant, as well as
money damages for all the monies it was fraudulently induced
to pay the defendant to develop EIG.
At no point did Mr.
Bailey testify that the plaintiff owned EIG.
Rather, he
claimed that the plaintiff's contracts with the defendant gave
it the right to use EIG and its source codes -- exclusively
while he worked for the plaintiff, non-exclusively thereafter
-- and to receive updates of the basic program even after the
termination of the defendant's employment." Underlines by
Defendant.
Comment:

As shown in Exhibit IV, page 3, item (6) the applicable

statement in the 3/19/91 contract is:
11

SWB shall continue to provide the Company with a detailed
explanation of the workings of the STAR program and shall
support other sales efforts within the Company for the STAR
program without additional compensation."
Underlines by
Defendant.
6

6>

It

is a clear

statement

that no monies

are paid

to che

Defendant for any work related to STAR and that the Plaintiff did
not intend to compensate the Defendant in any way for sales efforts
pertaining to STAR.

In no case, even by contractual evidence, was

money spent for the development of STAR as the Plaintiff claims.

As shown in Exhibit V, paragraph 2, the 11/27/91 contract
says:
"
You will provide the Company with all source codes,
documentation, input, limit factors and all other material
information regarding the use and operation of EIG, as soon as
possible and from time to time, in such form as the Company
may reasonably request.
In addition, you will provide the
Company with full information concerning any modifications you
make to EIG at any time in the future. If you are no longer
employed by the Company, your obligation to inform the Company
about future changes to EIG shall apply only to the EIG
programs as they exist on the date you leave the Company's
employment."
This statement in the non-disclosure contract clearly limits
the Plaintiff's claim on EIG/STAR, should it be bone fide, to the
state of EIG/STAR as it existed at the time of termination.

ITEM 7

Memorandum

3/23/95,

Page

11, paragraph

2, the

Court

states the testimony of Ms. Messer-Russo as follows:
11

Ms. Messer-Russo then testified that she had calculated
the total damages which the plaintiff had sustained by reason
of the defendant's total breach of his contractual obligations
to be $163,000. Those damages included $33,277 for expenses
incurred by the defendant for the further development of EIG,
$117,692 in total salary paid to the defendant, and $12,197 in
attorney's fees to prosecute this action.
Comment:

As shown in Exhibit IV, page 1, paragraph 2, and page 3,

item (6) the applicable statements in the 3/19/91 contract are:
7

7

"a. For revenue generated from the Airline Pilot program, the
separate agreement for compensation and equity participation
in TOR with SWB stands as specified; and
b.
SWB shall continue to provide the Company with a detailed
explanation of the workings of the STAR program and shall
support other sales efforts within the Company for the STAR
program without additional compensation."
Underlines by
Defendant.
Since the Defendant's salary was $60,000 per year and the
Defendant was in the employ of the Plaintiff for two years, it is
clear in the actual quote of (a.) that the Defendant receives all
of his compensation from his services to the Airline Pilot program
and clear from (b.) that the Plaintiff did not intend to nor did in
fact

compensate

the

pertaining to STAR.

Defendant

in

any

way

for

sales

efforts

In no case was money spent for the development

of STAR as the Plaintiff as Ms. Messer-Russo has testified.

To

prove this point the Court may ask Ms. Messer-Russo for time card
verification of the Defendant's hourly schedule.

ITEM 8

Memorandum 3/23/95, Page 17, last sentence, the Court

opinion as follows:
11

Indeed the several contracts presented to the Court made
it clear at all times that the plaintiff's legitimate
entitlement thereunder was not only to have EIG/STAR software
on their premises, available for their use without the
assistance of the defendant, but to have as well all source
codes and other documentation that were necessary to make
wholly independent use of EIG/STAR without the defendant's
assistance. Failure of the defendant to supply the plaintiff
with this information has prevented the plaintiff from usina
EIG/STAR at any time despite its substantial payments of
salary to the defendant to develop the program"
Comment:
Source Codes:

The words use and using in this context to not
8

s

give the plaintiff the opportunity to modify, change or examine
trade secrets of the defendant incorporated in EIG/STAR just: as the
use or using a word processing program like WORD or Word Perfect,
a spreadsheet program like Lotusl23 or Microsoft Excel, etc does
not give the person evaluating the program permission to examine
the source code of those programs.

This is an industry standard

which expert testimony can well establish.

The defendant has

thirteen years experience as a systems engineer with International
Business Machines Corporation

(1967-1980, employee

ID 911447,

verifiable at IBM HQ, Armonk, New York) and has supervised che
evaluation

of

many

IBM proprietary

software.

Organizations

performing the evaluation, just like the plaintiff, had full use of
the programs and could manipulate input data, output reports and
the way in which the information was processed, just like the
plaintiff was able to do with EIG/STAR.

They could not, however,

unless they purchased the program, examine the source code of che
proprietary modules and neither could the plaintiff.

The obvious

reason is that these codes are intellectual property; once given it
can not be taken back.

EIG/STAR was evaluated and used by

Connecticut Mutual Insurance Company, Phoenix Mutual Insurance
Company, Gardner & Preston Moss, and Wright Investors' Service. In
no case was the proprietary source code revealed except for Wright
Investors' Service who purchased the program after evaluating it
for one year.

The defendant knows for a surety the plaintiff is

not an expert in this field nor is the attorney for the plaintiff
as admitted in deposition of the defendant.
9

In November 1991, zhe

defendant hired an expert software attorney to draft a suitable
document

to allow the plaintiff

plaintiff wanted.

access to the information the

When a draft Software Licensing Agreement of

November 20, 1991, Exhibit VII, from Attorney Houston P. Lowrey was
presented

to the plaintiff, the plaintiff

document and summarily fired the defendant.

dismissed

the draft

The plaintiff then

proceeded to draft his own document that was unsuitable to permit
what was needed to protect the defendant.

Substantial payments of salary to develop the program:

It has

already been established several times in this motion, ITEM3 and
ITEM6, that the defendant's salary was solely as a result of work
for the plaintiff's airline pilot program and that the defendant
would promote STAR without additional compensation.
As shown in Exhibit IV, page 1, paragraph 2, and page 3, item (6)
the applicable statements in the 3/19/91 contract are:
"a. For revenue generated from the Airline Pilot program, the
separate agreement for compensation and equity participation
in TOR with SWB stands as specified; and
b.
SWB shall continue to provide the Company with a detailed
explanation of the workings of the STAR program and shall
support other sales efforts within the Company for the STAR
program without additional compensation."
Underlines by
Defendant.
Since the Defendant's salary was $60,000 per year and the
Defendant was in the employ of the Plaintiff for two years, it is
clear in the actual quote of (a.) that the Defendant receives all
of his compensation from his services to the Airline Pilot program
and clear from (b.) that the Plaintiff did not intend to nor did in
10

/D

fact

compensate

the

pertaining to STAR.

Defendant

in

any

way

for

sales

efforts

In no case was money spent for the development

of STAR as the Plaintiff has testified.

ITEM 9

Memorandum 3/23/95, Page 11, last sentence, the Court

restates testimony as follows:
"
Ms. Messer-Russo then testified that she calculated the
total damages which the plaintiff had sustained by reason of
the defendant's breech of his contractual obligations to be
$163,000.
Comment:
It is actually the plaintiff who owes the defendant large
ongoing sums of money.

Page 1, paragraph 2. (A) (2) and page 5,

paragraph 9. of the August 20, 1990 contract states:
"(2) After 12 months: 20 basis points, if the money is
managed at 200 basis points, but not to exceed 10% of the
company's net fee for money managed at less than 200
basis points, for as long as the money is under
management and you are a registered broker.
9.
This agreement may be terminated by the company at
any time for cause, but you shall continue to be entitled
to commissions on any money under management for so long
as you are eligible to receive such commissions under
federal or state securities laws. Cause shall mean (1)
loss or suspension of securities licenses by you, (2)
disclosure of the Sentry Formula, (3) disloyalty to the
company. In addition, this agreement may be terminated
at the end of the first 15 months for non-performance,
which means that you shall not have produced at least
$10,000,000 of wholesale and/or retail new accounts in
the first 15 months of employment."
Underlines by
defendant.
The

defendant

is

a

registered

agent

with

the

National

Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), broker # 1715572
and holds Series

7 and

63 qualifications.

The plaintiff

has

approximately $60,000,000 under management as of March 1995 in the
11
/ ;

airline pilot program and the defendant's approximate commissions
are:
($60,000,000) (.002)

$120,000 per year

These commissions are due and payable from the time the defendant
left the employ of the plaintiff on the amounts under management at
the end of years 1992, 1993 and 1994.

SUMMARY
The defendant recognizes the complexities of the contracts the
plaintiff has created and the nature of the plaintiff's complaint
to avoid going before the Department Of Labor or to avoid paying
the defendant commissions on rightly earned share of revenues from
money placed under management in the airline pilot program.

The

defendant asks the Court to revise its Memorandum based on the
actual contract language that has been shown in ITEMS 1 - 9
Motion.

Finally,

the defendant

asks

the

Court

in this-

to order

the

plaintiff to fulfil its obligation to pay the defendant commissions
stated in the plaintiff's contract of 8/20/95, ITEM9.

DEFENDANT
Stephen W. Brockbank

Stephen W. Brockbank, pro se
263 G Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84103
(801) 596-9708
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